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1 In the European Union, Directive 2007/64/EC of the
European Parliament and of the Council of 13
November 2007 on payment services in the
internal market amending Directives 97/7/EC,
2002/65/EC, 2005/60/EC and 2006/48/EC and
repealing Directive 97/5/EC (Text with EEA
relevance), OJ L 319, 5.12.2007, p. 1–36 applies,
and in the United States of America, U. S. Code
Title 15, Chapter 41, Subchapter VI, § 1693f. Error
resolution, applies.
2 The Depositor Protection Act uses the term
‘Fusei’. This term generally means not right,
wrong, illegal, improper.
3 Some Japanese Statutes and case judgments are
translated into English by a government support
project entitled the ‘Transparency of Japanese Law
Project’. This source of legal information is
available at http://www.tomeika.jur.kyushu-
u.ac.jp/.
4 http://www.fsa.go.jp/news/22/ginkou/ 20110421-
1.html.
Introduction 
The withdrawal of cash from an ATM using a stolen or
forged cash card is a common problem troubling
countries across the world. The response naturally
differs between States because of the differences
between legal systems.1 In Japan, the Depositor
Protection Act was enacted to respond to the problem of
improper (unauthorized or illegal2) withdrawals in
2005.3 If certain conditions are fulfilled, the depositor
can claim an indemnity for the unauthorized withdrawal
from the financial institution. Of interest is that even
after the Act entered into force, the numbers of
unauthorized withdrawals had not decreased
dramatically.
This article introduces some statistical data relating to
unauthorized withdrawals; describes the process of the
Depositor Protection Act; considers a number of
judgments in relevant cases, and sets out the practical
response by financial institutions.
Implications from statistical data 
The Financial Service Agency published the latest
statistical data of forged bank cards and stolen bank
cards in April 2011.4 For the purposes of this article, the
historical statistical data (beginning from April 2000) is
summarized into four categories, based on the reports
from financial institutions about the number of cases
and the amount of losses through illegal withdrawals
using forged bank cards, stolen bank cards, stolen bank
books and internet banking. The incidence of
unauthorized withdrawals by means of forged cards has
gradually decreased. However, unauthorized
withdrawals using stolen cards and stolen bank books
has remained at the same level. The decrease in the 
use of forged cards may well see a reduction in
indemnity claims.
Summary of data
In the tables below, the data collection period of each
category of crimes is different. Forged bank cards cover
the period from April 2000 to December 2010. Stolen
bank cards cover the period from February 2005 to
December 2010. Stolen bank books cover the period
from April 2003 to December 2010, and internet 
banking covers the period from February 2005 to
December 2010.
Table 1 The number of cases for the four categories of crimes
(* This data collection period is for nine months. ‘Convert a year’
means that the author has added data to estimate the full year by
multiplying by 1.33.)
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Period April April April April Through Total
2007 – 2008 – 2009 – 2010 – all periods
March March March December
2008 2009 2010 2010
(*Convert 
a year)
Crime categories
Forged 704 435 305 173 April 3,752
bank (*231) 2000 – 
card December 
2010
Stolen 5,299 5,039 5,933 4,783 April 34,578
bank (*6,377) 2005 – 
card December 
2010
Stolen 289 266 225 168 April 2,465
bank (*224) 2003 –
book December 
2010
Internet 233 136 57 59 February 637
banking (*76) 2005 – 
December 
2010
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Table 2 Average amount of damage per incident
Notes to Table 2 (These notes are attached to the
original statistical data.)
1. The unit is ten thousand Japanese Yen.
2. The Law of protecting depositors from illegal
withdrawal by automated teller machine (ATM)
using a forged card and a stolen card was in force
from 10 February 2006.
3. The number of cases of indemnity is the number of
cases where the indemnity was met in whole or part
by financial institutions.
4. The total number is summed up by each of the crime
categories for the periods indicated.
Table 3 Number of indemnity claims and decisions relating to
forged cards
Notes to Table 3 (These notes are attached to the
original statistical data.)
1. The main reasons for a financial institution to deny
an indemnity claim are: where a depositor, having
made a claim, withdraws it (63 cases), and gross
negligence of the depositor (16 cases).
2. The cases of claims for an indemnity claim include
cases where withdrawals were made using a forged
card, and after an investigation (or a hearing) it was
proved (or shown) that the spouse or a relative of
the depositor used the genuine card issued to the
depositor. If these cases were withdrawn from the
cases of indemnity claims, the ratio of indemnity
acceptance may be changed by (from 96.5%) up 
to 98.7%.
Table 4 Number of indemnity claims and decisions relating to
stolen cards
Notes to Table 4 (These notes are attached to the
original statistical data.)
1. The main reasons for the financial institution to
deny a claim for an indemnity are: where a
depositor, having made a claim, withdraws it (4,234
cases), unauthorized withdrawal by using a lost
card (2,854 cases) and withdrawal by a spouse or a
relative of the depositor (1,788 cases).
2. The cases of claims for an indemnity claim include
cases where withdrawals were made using a forged
card, and after an investigation (or a hearing) it was
proved (or shown) that the spouse or a relative of
the depositor used the genuine card issued to the
depositor. If these cases are removed from the
cases of indemnity claim, the ratio of indemnity
acceptance may be changed by (from 58.6%) up to
83.3%.
Period April April April April Through Average
2007 – 2008 – 2009 – 2010 – all periods
March March March December
2008 2009 2010 2010
(*Convert 
a year)
Crime categories
Forged 61 66 55 85 April 107
bank 2000 – 
card December 
2010
Stolen 41 45 47 58 April 52
bank 2005 – 
card December 
2010
Stolen 160 117 105 80 April 197
bank 2003 –
book December 
2010
Internet 81 105 60 90 February 103
banking 2005 – 
December 
2010
Period April April April April Total
2007 – 2008 – 2009 – 2010 – April 
March March March December 2000 – 
2008 2009 2010 2010 December
(*Convert 2010
a year)
Crime categories
Indemnity 679 424 287 112  3,612 
claim (*149)
Accepted 654 413 269 112  3,485 
(96.3%) (97.4%) (93.7%) (100.0%) (96.5%)
Denied 25 (3.7%) 11 (2.6%) 18 (6.3%) 0 (0%) 127 (3.5%)
Period April April April April Total
2007 – 2008 – 2009 – 2010 – April 
March March March December 2005 – 
2008 2009 2010 2010 December
(*Convert 2010
a year)
Crime categories
Indemnity 5,284 5,008 5,834 3,554  33,139 
claim (*4,739)
Accepted 2,967  2,668  3,173  1,894   19,423 
(56.2%) (53.3%) (54.4%) (53.3%) (58.6%))
Denied 2,317 2,340 2,661 1,660 13,716 
(43.8%) (46.7%) (45.6%) (46.7%) (41.4%)
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Table 5 Number of indemnity claims and decisions relating to
stolen bank books
Note to Table 5 (These notes are attached to the original
statistical data.)
The cases of claims for an indemnity claim include
cases where withdrawals were made using a stolen
bank book, and after an investigation (or a hearing) it
was proved (or shown) that the spouse or a relative of
the depositor used the genuine card issued to the
depositor used the bank book. If these cases are
removed from the cases of indemnity claim, the ratio of
indemnity acceptance may be changed by (from 34.0%)
up to 43.6%.
Table 6 Number of indemnity claims and decisions relating to
internet banking
Note to Table 6
The cases of indemnity claim include cases where the
withdrawal was by a third person, but after an
investigation (or hearing) it was proved (or shown) that
the withdrawal was by the spouse or a relative of the
depositor. If these cases are removed from cases of
indemnity claim, the ratio of indemnity acceptance may
be changed by (from 74.1%) up to 85.4%.
Japanese Law does not provide for a ‘lost
card’ directly
Section 3 of the Depositor Protection Act5 excludes the
applicability of the Civil Code where funds are
withdrawn by the use of a forged card. Where a
withdrawal is made using a forged card, section 4
provides that the customer is indemnified in full, on
condition that the depositor is not grossly negligent.
Where a withdrawal is made using a stolen card, section
5 provides that the customer can be indemnified by up
to three fourths of the amount of the unauthorized
withdrawal after the depositor has given notice to the
financial institution about the theft, even if the
depositor is deemed to be slightly negligent. The
combination of the provisions of the Depositor
Protection Act and the Civil Code increase the
opportunity for the depositor to obtain an indemnity
payment for an unauthorized withdrawal, in comparison
to the provisions contained in the Civil Code alone. The
Depositor Protection Act also provides an indemnity for
the unauthorized withdrawal or the provision of a loan
by way of an ATM using forged and stolen cards (section
2(4) and (5)). The word ‘card’ means a card for the
withdrawal of funds, or any other instrument, such as a
bank book that also functions as a means of obtaining a
loan for money, and issued to the depositor in
accordance with a contract of deposit and savings with
a financial institution. However, the Act does not cover
the position when a card is lost. In this respect, the law
in Japan differs from the EU payment services Directive,
in that article 61(4) provides that the ‘payer shall not
bear any financial consequences resulting from use of
the lost, stolen or misappropriated payment instrument
after notification in accordance with Article 56(1)(b),
except where he has acted fraudulently.’6 Article 4(3)
defines a payment instrument as ‘any personalised
device(s) and/or set of procedures agreed between the
5 The title of the law literally translated is ‘the law
of protecting the depositors from improper
withdrawal by ATM using a forged card or
instrument and a stolen card or instrument’.
6 Directive 2007/64/EC of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 13 November 2007 on
payment services in the internal market amending
Directives 97/7/EC, 2002/65/EC, 2005/60/EC and
2006/48/EC and repealing Directive 97/5/EC (Text
with EEA relevance), OJ L 319, 5.12.2007, p. 1–36.
Period April April April April Total
2007 – 2008 – 2009 – 2010 – April 
March March March December 2003 – 
2008 2009 2010 2010 December
(*Convert 2010
a year)
Crime categories
Indemnity 214 248 199 105 2,241 
claim (*140)
Accepted 15 143 96 61  763 
(53.7%) (57.7%) (48.2%) (58.1%) (34.0%)
Denied 99 105 103 44 1,478 
(46.3%) (42.3%) (51.8%) (41.9%) (66.0%)
Period April April April April Total
2007 – 2008 – 2009 – 2010 – April 
March March March December 2005 – 
2008 2009 2010 2010 December
(*Convert 2010
a year)
Crime categories
Indemnity 207 65 28 20 467 
claim (*27)
Accepted 186 34 9 10  346 
(89.9%) (52.3%) (32.1%) (50.0%) (74.1%)
Denied 21 31 19 10 121
(10.1%) (47.7%) (67.9%) (50.0%) (25.9%)
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payment service user and the payment service provider
and used by the payment service user in order to initiate
a payment order’. The article does not specifically refer
to the use of forged cards or other forms of payment
instrument that have been forged. A ‘payment service
user’ means only the authorized person, such as the
depositor using a genuine card. Article 4(10) provides
the definition of ‘payment service user’, which means ‘a
natural or legal person making use of a payment service
in the capacity of either payer or payee, or both’. Where
a third person uses a forged card, for instance, they are
not a payer or payee, because they must be ‘in the
capacity of either payer or payee’, and a third party in
possession of a forged card does not have any authority,
because the card is forged. A forged card cannot be
considered to be a ‘payment instrument’ because it is
not a device that has been personalized by the provider
for the customer. In the United Kingdom, the Directive
has been implemented by the Payment Services
Regulations 2009 (SI 2009 No. 209), which provides
corresponding regulations.
The process of enacting the Depositor
Protection Act
The final report of ‘The study group on the problems of
forged cash card’, sponsored by the Japanese Financial
Service Agency (FSA), was published in 2005.7 The study
was chaired by Professor Shinsaku Iwahara8 of Tokyo
University, and the group consisted of scholars in
contract law, bankers, police office and consumer
protection institutions.9 Based on the discussion of the
study group, in a short space of time, House members
of the Diet drafted and enacted the Depositor Protecting
Act. Enacted in 2005 (The Law No.94, 2005), it was in
force from 10 February 2006.
Relationships between the Act and the 
Civil Code
Before the enactment of the Depositor Protection Act,
the effect of an unauthorized withdrawal was mainly
governed by article 478 of the Civil Code, which
provides:10
‘A performance by the person to a Quasi possessor of
claim is valid, if the person is bona fides and without
negligence concerning their performance.’
Historically, this article was modeled on article 1240 of
the French Civil Code over one hundred years ago.11 The
technology having changed, the original article was not
intended to apply to unauthorized withdrawals by ATM.
This was the main reason that discussions on the
application of article 478 in relation to unauthorized
withdrawals by ATM had continued to be disputed in
litigation in Japan. The Depositor Protection Act is an
attempt to solve this controversy, although discussions
continue because of the complexity of the conditions
relating to the depositors negligence for an indemnity
claim, as in the 2008 case (for which see below).
Section 3 of the Depositor Protection Act excludes the
application of the provisions of article 478 to
withdrawals using a forged card, but the article still
applies to withdrawals using a stolen card. Section 3
reads as follows:
Section 3 (Special rule of the Civil Code concerning to
withdrawal and loan by ATM using a card or
instrument)
Article 478 of the Civil Code does not apply to
withdrawals by ATM and loans by ATM using a card or
an instrument similar to a card (hereinafter “ATM
withdrawal and loan”). Excepting that the article of
the Civil Code applies to the ATM withdrawal and loan
by the genuine card or other instrument.
According to these provisions, if a withdrawal made by
ATM is proper or valid, the withdrawal has the effect of
performance by the financial institution to the depositor.
It is not necessary to indemnify the depositor.
Section 4 of the Depositor Protection Act provides for
the legal effect of the withdrawal of money by way of an
ATM using a forged card:
Section 4 (Effect of the ATM withdrawal and loan by
the forged card or instrument)
1) The withdrawal by ATM using the forged card or
7 http://www.fsa.go.jp/singi/singi_fccsg/gaiyou/f-
20050304-singi_fccsg/01.pdf.
8 Professor Shinsaku Iwahara is also the author of
“Electronic Payment and Law” (Denshi-Kesai-to-
Hou) (Yuhikaku 2003), in which he discussed the
problem of unauthorized withdrawals.
9 http://www.fsa.go.jp/singi/singi_fccsg/
singi_fccsg.html.
10 The Transparency of Japanese Law Project
translates article 478 of the Civil Code as ‘Any
performance made vis-a-vis a holder of quasi-
possession of the claim shall remain effective to
the extent the person who performed such
obligation acted without knowledge, and was
free from any negligence.’ This does not seem to
be a literal translation and may not be helpful to
describe why the Japanese courts had discussed
the applicability of the article to unauthorized
withdrawals by way of an ATM.
11 Shoji Kawakami, ‘Article 478 of the Code of Civil,
performance to the quasi possessor of claims’, in
Hironaka & Hoshino, editors, Minpou-No-
Hyakunen, Volume 3 at 165 (Yuhikaku 1998).
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other instrument is valid, if i) the withdrawal is
based on the intention of the depositor who
concludes the contract of deposit and saving
relating to the withdrawal by ATM, or ii) on
condition that the financial institution concluding
the contract of deposits and savings is in good faith
and without negligence relating to the withdrawal
by ATM, the withdrawal is based on the gross
negligence of the depositor.
2) The depositor is responsible for the loan by ATM
using a forged card or instrument, if i) the loan is
based on the intention of the depositor who
concludes the contract of deposit and saving
relating to the loan by ATM, or ii) on condition that
the financial institution concluding the contract of
deposits and savings is in good faith and without
negligence relating to the loan by ATM, the loan is
based on the gross negligence of the depositor.
As mentioned above, the provisions of article 478 of the
Civil Code applies to withdrawals using a stolen card.
This means that the Depositor Protection Act provides
for a special provision in relation to the meaning of
article 478. Article 478 does not require the depositor to
be negligent. However, by section 5 of the Depositor
Protection Act, it is the responsibility of the depositor
not to be negligent. It should be noted that where the
depositor is deemed to be slightly negligent, the
indemnity claim is limited to three fourths of the
amount of the illegal withdrawal. Section 5 reads as
follows:
Section 5 (Indemnity of the amount of the ATM
withdrawal and loan using a stolen card)
(1) The depositor can request the financial institution
that he concludes the deposits and savings contract
the indemnity the amount of the withdrawal by ATM
using a stolen card or instrument, where his/her
genuine card or instrument had been stolen and all
conditions provided in subdivisions are fulfilled.
(i) the depositor gave quick notice to the financial
institution after recognizing the fact of the theft of
the genuine card or instrument
(ii) the depositor explained the situation of the theft
adequately and without delay for the request to
the financial institution
(iii) the depositor informed the financial institution
that he/she had reported the theft to the
investigation office or presented materials
presuming the theft as defined by the Rule of the
Cabinet Office.
(2) The financial institution that is claimed by the
depositor of the indemnity provided by the
subsection 1, should pay the amount of withdrawal
by ATM to the requesting depositor (it is limited the
amount of withdrawals by ATM after the standard
day. Hereinafter “the amount of acceptable
indemnity”), except that the financial institution
proves the fact that the withdrawal by ATM was not
illegal with the use of a stolen card or instrument,
or the withdrawal is based on the intention of the
depositor requesting the indemnity. In case that the
financial institution proves that the financial
institution is bona fides and not negligent relating
to the illegality of the withdrawal by ATM using a
stolen card or instrument, and that the withdrawal
is based on the negligence (except for gross
negligence) of the depositor, the financial
institution should pay to the requesting depositor
three forth of the amount of acceptable indemnity.
The legal position with respect to negligence and the
extent of the depositor’s responsibility under the
Depositor Protection Act is very complex, for both the
financial institution and the depositor, because of the
decisions made by judges before the Depositor
Protection Act was brought into force.
Supreme Court cases before the Depositor
Protection Act 
In the following section, a number of cases are
discussed, illustrating the approach taken by the
Supreme Court in relation to the provisions of article
478 of the Civil Code.
Supreme Court decision on 19 July 199312
The plaintiff depositor had 2 million and 50 thousand
Japanese yen in their savings account at the defendant
bank. An unknown person effected withdrawals in one
12 Supreme Court decision on 19 July 1993, Hanrei-
Jiho No. 1489 at 111. See also, the English
translation in the Transparency of Japanese Law
Project’ web site, http://www2.osipp.osaka-
u.ac.jp/~nomura/project/inter_finance/eng/casesj
%20English.html. The original decisions are:
Tokyo District court decision on 1 January 1989,
and Tokyo High Court decision on 19 July 1989.
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day by way of ATMs (seven times at one branch and five
times at another bank that had an agreement to use the
ATMs of the plaintiff’s bank), which left only 100
thousand Japanese yen in his account. The plaintiff
claimed the payment of 1 million and 950 thousand
Japanese yen from the defendant bank, based on the
savings contract between the plaintiff and his bank. It is
not clear from the court record of this case whether the
withdrawals were by way of a stolen card or a forged
card. It is certain that a third person other than the
plaintiff withdrew the money from the ATMs according
to the video tape recording.
In this case, the magnetic stripe on the reverse of the
cash card included a record of the personal
identification number (PIN) that the depositor assigns
(and the bank records) when the card was issued.13
It was accepted that it was possible to obtain the data
on the magnetic stripe through a card reader and a
personal computer that could be purchased on the
general market. However, the person using such
equipment needed to have the knowledge of a
computer and sufficient technical experience to decode
the data on the card. Taking these circumstances into
account, the management of the PIN by the bank was
deemed to be sufficient to enable the bank to rely on
the clause that the bank was free from the indemnity
claim. The court rejected the indemnity claim by the
depositor.
The members of the court decided that the provisions
of article 478 acted to make the bank immune from all
obligations where the bank checked the correctness of
the cash card and PIN automatically by way of the ATM
where the withdrawal was effected. Even if the genuine
card and correct PIN was used, the bank was not
obliged to indemnify the depositor where a withdrawal
by ATM took place by a person other than the depositor,
unless there were special circumstances, such as the
insufficiency of the management of the PIN code by the
bank. The Supreme Court concluded that article 478 of
the Civil Code applied to a quasi-claimer, that is to the
withdrawal by an ATM by a person other than depositor.
As a result, the bank could only be negligent if there
were special circumstances, such as a failure of the
bank to keep the PIN secure. In effect, it meant that the
bank was free from an indemnity claim for the
unauthorized withdrawal of funds. On the other hand, it
was necessary for the depositor to prove that the
special circumstances existed in the bank to indicate
the bank had not maintained sufficient security when
claiming indemnity by means of an unauthorized
withdrawal.
A change of view
The Supreme Court maintained the applicability of
article 478 of the Civil Code to the withdrawal of funds
by way of an ATM for some years. However, in a 2003
case, the Supreme Court reviewed the standard when
deciding the issue of the negligence of the bank in
cases concerning unauthorized withdrawals by ATMs. In
this case, it was determined that the bank is not
negligent for the unauthorized withdrawal of funds by
way of an ATM, providing the bank establishes that it
has taken as many appropriate actions as it can to
construct, build and manage the ATM system in such a
way as to exclude the possibility of unauthorized
withdrawals. It meant that the bank is required to prove
the fact that the ATM system in its totality is established
and managed to exclude unauthorized withdrawals. If a
bank fails to prove the integrity of its systems, the bank
is obliged to indemnify the depositor for the
unauthorized withdrawal. The 1993 Supreme Court
decision placed the burden of proof on the depositor,
who had to prove the bank had insufficient security. The
2003 Supreme Court decision shifted the burden back
to the bank.
Supreme Court decision on 8 April 200314
In this case, the appellant possessed a bank book and a
cash card. She decided that the PIN of her cash card
would be the same four digits as her car registration
number. The appellant had her car stolen, which was
parked near her house. She left her bank book in the
glove compartment. She reported the theft to the police
office on the day of the theft, and reported the theft to
the bank the next day, after remembering that she left
her bank book in the glove compartment. Before she
reported the theft of her bank book, an unknown person
withdrew 8 million Japanese Yen by way of an ATM,
using the stolen bank book. The appellant claimed an
indemnity from the bank, asserting that the withdrawal
was invalid.
The appellant was not aware that she could withdraw
money through an ATM using her bank book without her
cash card, because her bank did not provide any
information about the possibility of the withdrawal by
13 In Japan, the PIN is usually determined by the
depositor, because they write their chosen PIN on
the application form before the card is issued; if
the depositor does not change the PIN, they can
use the PIN that they write on the application
form
14 Supreme Court decision on 8 April 2003, MINSHU
Vol. 57 No. 4 at 337; Hanrei-Times No. 1121 at 96.
See the English translation at the Transparency of
Japanese Law Project web site,
http://www2.osipp.osaka-
u.ac.jp/~nomura/project/inter_finance/eng/casesj
%20English.html.
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way of ATM using a bank book. The terms of use
included a deposit and saving clause, a clause about
the use of the cash card, and a clause relating to the
immunity of the bank in relation to its obligations in
respect of unauthorized withdrawals by way of an ATM.
In the first instance, the High Court applied the
provisions of article 478 of the Civil Code in this case,
determining that the bank was not responsible for the
withdrawal of the money by ATM using the stolen bank
book.
The Supreme Court reversed the High Court decision.
The Supreme Court decided that article 478 applied to
withdrawals by an ATM, but a withdrawal is valid only if
the bank proves that it was not negligent. To decide
whether the bank is not negligent, it was for the bank to
prove that the automatic verification of the bank book
and PIN is accurate, and as a whole that the entire ATM
system is established and managed in such a way as to
exclude the possibility that a person can effect a
transaction without authority.
In this case, the relevant contractual clause in relation
to the use of the cash card failed to clarify that it was
possible to effect withdrawals by way of an ATM using a
bank book on its own, and that the bank maintained the
system that permitted the withdrawals by way of an
ATM using a bank book on its own. The members of the
Supreme Court concluded that even if the appellant
decided that the PIN of four digits would be the same as
the car registration number, and forgot that she left the
bank book in glove compartment of her motor car, these
facts did not overcome the negligence of the bank. The
bank was required to indemnify the depositor for the
unauthorized withdrawal.
In this respect, the 2003 decision acted to provide
better consumer protection for depositors against
unauthorized withdrawals.
Cases decided after enforcement of the
Depositor Protection Act
The Depositor Protection Act does not include a
provision on the allocation of responsibility between a
depositor and a financial institution where unauthorized
withdrawals take place before the depositor receives
the card. This has been left for the courts to decide.15
Osaka District Court decision on 17 April 200816
The plaintiff’s bank book, cash card, driving license and
her husband’s cash card were all stolen from her car.
She immediately reported the theft to the police office.
On the following day, she requested the bank to issue a
new bank book and a cash card, and assigned the PIN
as her birthday. A new bank book and cash card was
sent to the depositor through the postal service, but
they were stolen by a third party. The thief
impersonated the plaintiff’s husband by showing a
document purporting to be a form of medical insurance
identity at the post office, and received the bank book
and cash card. The thief withdrew 4.95 million Japanese
Yen by way of ATM using the new card. The plaintiff
claimed an indemnity of the amount withdrawn against
the bank, based on section 5(1) of the Depositor
Protection Act.
The court focused on two issues: first, whether
section 4(1) applied to the withdrawal, and second,
whether the depositor was grossly negligent. On the
first issue, the court concluded that the new card that
was stolen before the depositor obtained possession of
it, and it should be treated as a forged card or other
instrument under the law. Respecting the second issue,
the court concluded that the plaintiff was not grossly
negligent relating to the withdrawal, even where she
assigned the PIN to be the same numbers as her
birthday. On this point, the members of the court
reasoned as follows: in the management of the PIN for a
cash card, Japanese financial institutions approve the
used of an easy to remember PIN, such as the
depositor’s birthday, etc.17 The situation had not
changed after the enactment of the Depositor Protection
Act. The defendant bank did not prohibit the plaintiff
from using a PIN that would be easy to remember.
Commentary
The critical defect of the traditional withdrawal system
was pointed out some time ago.18 For a long time, it was
believed that the bank’s computer systems were
protected by the double safety measures. The Japanese
traditional system of withdrawals by means of the
identification stamp (‘Inkan’) and bank book
incorporated such double safety measures, in which two
physical things had to be stolen at the same time to
withdraw money. The cash card system also had double
15 If this case were in the United Kingdom,
Regulation 58(2) of the Payment Services
Regulations 2009 (SI 2009 No. 209) would apply,
and the bank is responsible for the unauthorized
withdrawal.
16 Osaka District Court decision on 17 April 2008,
Hanrei-Jiho No. 2006 at 87.
17 On the problems relating to the ability of a
human to remember a large number of
passwords, see Wendy Moncur and Dr Grégory
Leplâtre, ‘PINs, passwords and human memory’,
Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law
Review, 6 (2009) 116 – 122.
18 Tsuneo Matsumoto, Forged or Stolen Cash Card
and The Depositor Protection Act – Significance
of Enactment and Remaining Issues, Hou-To-
Computer, No. 24 at 96 (2006).
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19 Yasushi Nakayama, ‘Issues for the evaluation of
the Depositor Protection Act-focusing on internet
banking’, Kinyu-Houmu-Jijyo No. 1782 at 1
(2006). (He proposed introducing a multiple
authentication system and a severance system of
improper transactions); Naoyuki Iwashita, ‘What
should be requested for information security of
financial institutions’, Kinyu-Kenkyu, 2006.8 at
17, available at
http://www.imes.boj.or.jp/research/
paers/Japanese/06-J-05.pdf. At the study group
on the problems of forged cash card, these
system are discussed on 15th April 2005,
http://www.fsa.go.jp/singi/singi_fccsg/gaiyou/f-
20050415-singi_fccsg.html; in relation to multiple
authentication systems, see
http://www.fsa.go.jp/singi/singi_fccsg/gaiyou/f-
20050415-singi_fccsg/03.pdf; for an examination
of the tolerance of forgery of biometric
authentication systems, see
http://www.fsa.go.jp/singi/singi_fccsg/gaiyou/f-
20050415-singi_fccsg/02.pdf. Some banks have
introduced one time pass words as an optional
service for internet banking. On the payment of a
small additional fee, the depositor can borrow
one time password equipment from the bank.
20 Akemi Nomura, How funny Japanese Laws are,
Second Session, Regulatory Impact Assessment
of Japanese financial laws, NBL No.900 at 84
(2009).
21 Toru Mikami, Problems of the Depositor
Protection Act, Shindo & Uchida editors,
Continual Contract and Business Law Practices, at
267 (Shoji-Houmu 2006).
22 Tsukasa Hara, ‘Reconsider of conditions of
Section 4 of The Law of Protecting the Depositors
from Illegal Withdrawal by the ATM Using a
Forged Card and a Stolen Card’, Hanrei-Times No.
1320 at 5 (2010).
safety measures, incorporating the physical item of the
card with the PIN. Superficially, the cash card system
was considered to have double safety measures (the
physical item (a card) and intangible things
(information, PIN). Even if a thief got hold of the card,
but was not able to obtain the PIN, the card could not
be used. The thief needed to obtain both the physical
item and the intangible data. The assumption was, that
only authorized machines would read the data.
However, it is well known that thieves developed
machines to read and record the data on the magnetic
stripe, which then enables them to use the data to make
withdrawals from ATMs without having the card issued
to the customer by the bank. The fact is, that the thief
would ensure that the depositor was not aware that the
data on their magnetic stripe was being read and
recorded without their knowledge.
The withdrawal system had previously been protected
by a single measure. Until about ten years ago, the
identification stamp was put on the back page of the
bank book to verify the stamp of the withdraw slip when
it was presented to the bank. If a thief stole a bank
book, it was possible for them to forge the stamp from
the image on the back page of the bank book. Some old
style bank books continue to be used, because some
depositors might not use the account often, and a new
bank book is not issued until the old one is full. The
image on the back page has now been abandoned. The
system is now based on the card and PIN, but it may
often be considered to only have a single safety
measure, because the depositor often assigns the PIN
to four digits that are easy to memorize, such as the
birthday, telephone number, or car registration number.
To make up for the defect of safety measures of the
card and PIN, a limit could be placed on the amount of
money that could be withdrawn; the PIN could be
changed to include more digits or letters of the
alphabet, or by insurance. The application of more
security measures might lead to the reduction of the
social problems that occur in relation to the illegal
withdrawal of money by way of ATM.19
Some commentators suggest that the contract
between a bank and a depositor should be reconsidered
as an alternative solution to the Depositor Protection
Act. Other scholars and bank practitioners argue20 that
the Depositor Protection Act is not the appropriate
mechanism to solve the issues of unauthorized
withdrawals. When the legislature enacts new laws and
introduces regulations, it is suggested that the
politicians ought to analyze and evaluate the effect of
the proposed law on the national economy, business
and customers in quantitative ways. As a matter of
policy, it must be preferable to protect the depositor
from loss caused by a theft or the forgery of a cash card.
However, the Depositor Protection Act provides that the
depositor is responsible for the amount of the
unauthorized withdrawal where he is grossly negligent,
but he is also responsible for twenty five per cent of the
loss where he is considered to have been slightly
negligent. There is a risk that the financial institutions
fail to prove the depositor has been negligent, but also
the danger that the depositor does not have a sufficient
incentive to take care of their cash card or bank book.
An alternative method of protection may be to shift the
burden of proof, by making the depositor prove that
they were not negligent, but limiting the loss that the
depositor should bear as a trade off.
Bank practitioners argue that, based on the case law
and provisions of the Act, Japanese financial institutions
bear a strict liability for unauthorized withdrawals by
way of ATMs using stolen or forged cash cards or other
instruments.21 The judge in the 2008 Osaka District
Court case emphasized the need to confirm the
consistency between article 478 of the Civil Code and
the Depositor Protection Act (especially section 4).22
Both provisions relate to the discharge of the financial
institution from an indemnity claim by a depositor.
However, the former does not require the depositor to
be negligent, but the latter requires the depositor to be
grossly negligent. The learned judge indicated that to
confirm the consistency of the provisions of the
Depositor Protection Act, the financial institution is
responsible for furnishing sufficient evidence of the
security steps employed by the bank to ensure the
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system is secure, and that the depositor understood the
risk of unauthorized withdrawal, and the need for the
depositor to take sufficient security steps themselves.
Reaction by financial institutions
The financial institutions responded to the passing of
the Depositor Protection Act by amending the clauses of
their contracts with customers relating to the use of the
cash card. They explained to their customers that it was
necessary to keep the cash card and PIN safe, and if the
PIN is written down, it must not be stored with the cash
card.23 Section 9(4) of the Depositor Protection Act
requests, but does not require depositors to make their
own provisions for the safety of the cash card. After the
decision of the Supreme Court in 2003, financial
institutions have an obligation under the Depositor
Protection Act to improve the security level of their
banking systems, otherwise the institution is deemed as
being negligent in respect of unauthorized withdrawals
from ATMs.
Arguably, one of the most effective measures to
improve the level of security is to replace the present
ATMs by a machine that supports the integrated circuit
cash card (IC bank card) to provide for authentication by
using biometric measurements. The problem with this
suggestion is that financial institutions and other
business entities need to introduce replacement
machines slowly, because of the costs involved.24
Each year the Japanese FSA publishes a document
entitled ‘Reaction to the forged bank card and internet
banking issues’, which also describes the introduction
of the IC bank card, the biometric IC bank card, and the
authentication procedure for internet banking based on
the survey carried out by a questionnaire to financial
institutions.25 The data shows that the ratio of ATMs that
support biometric authentication has increased year by
year, but they are less than half of all the ATMs.
Table 8 IC card, biometrics card, authentication procedure for
internet banking26
Limiting the amount of withdrawal by 
cash card
Most financial institutions have revised the amount a
customer can withdraw. It is now lower than previously.
For the magnetic type card, the initial limitation to
withdraw cash by way of ATM is up to 500,000 yen per
day, and the amount that can be transferred by ATM is
limited to 1 million yen per day. The depositor has the
opportunity to set the limitation to a lower amount than
the initial amount set by the financial institution. On the
other hand, the limit is set at 10 million yen per day for
the biometric authentication card. It depends on the
individual financial institution as to whether the
depositor can change the limitation to a lower amount
23 An example of explanation of a bank is
something like the following: ‘Request to
customers. Please keep your cash card and a PIN
strictly safe. You are especially to avoid the
following things, otherwise we may not
indemnify your loss.
Not to pass a cash card to a third person or let a
third person known your PIN; Not write your PIN
on a cash card or to keep and take a memo of a
PIN with a cash card; To assign a PIN to the
number, for example birthday, home address,
home telephone number, office telephone
number, registration number of automobile etc.,
which a third person could know; To use a PIN as
a lock number of shelf and safety box etc.; To
leave a cash card in an automobile, or to leave it
in a situation where it can be easily stolen
because of being deeply drunk.’
24 In Japan there are many ATMs in convenience
stores. For example the SEVEN-ELEVEN
convenience store chain has 15,639 ATMs (3 July
2011) and the LAWSON store chain has 8,559
ATMs (5 July 2011). Most ATMs in banks are not
available 24 hours all the year round. On the
other hand, an ATM in a convenience store is
available all the time. The number of ATMs in
convenience stores is increasing. Convenience
stores save the cost of the ATM and acquire
customers competing with the banks: Tadaaki
Nemoto, History of Bank ATM-from view point for
service of depositors, (Nihon-Keizai-Hyoronsha
2008) at 18. However, a greater number of ATMs
in convenience stores do not include biometric
authentication.
25 The data at the end of March 2010,
http://www.fsa.go.jp/news/21/ginkou/20100611-
1.html, March 2009,
[http://www.fsa.go.jp/news/20/ginkou/20090630-
2/01.pdf; March 2008,
http://www.fsa.go.jp/news/19/ginkou/20080708-
2.pdf; March 2007,
http://www.fsa.go.jp/news/18/ginkou/20070620-
2.pdf.
26 This table was prepared by the author, based on
the data published by the Japanese FSA. Some
items are omitted.
2007 2008 2009 2010
Bank cards issued 340,790 469,314 478,436 488,389
IC Bank Card 9,934 26,283 41,788 57,471  
(2.9%) (5.6%) (8.7%) (11.8%)
Biometrics 2,051 11,626 26,456 36,151
(0.6%) (3.1%) (5.5%) (7.4%)
ATM 126,537 155,768 158,020 158,207
Supporting 54,139 99,529 119,624 126,672
IC bank card (42.8%) (63.9%) (75.7%) (80.1%)
Supporting 18,499 51,773 66,463 69,782
biometrics (14.6%) (33.2%) (42.1%) (44.1%)
Financial Institutions 1,626 1,611 1,543 1,505
Providing internet 1,543 1,520 1,460 1,412
banking
Multi step 1,538 1,516 1,457 1,409
authentication (99.7%) (99.7%) (99.8%) (99.8%)
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27 Toru Mikami, The enactment on the forged and
stolen card and bank problems, Kinyu-Houmu-
Jijyo, No. 1768 at 4 (2006).
28 http://www.zenginkyo.or.jp/hosho/about/
index.html.
29 Asahi newspaper, 2 June 2011.
than the initial setting.
Setting the limitation to the amount of withdrawal
acts as a safeguard to eliminate losses caused by
unauthorized withdrawals using forged or stolen cards.
The depositors are made to become aware of and more
fully control their capability of using money in a day. In
this respect, the limits imposed by the banks have an
educational effect, in that the depositor is made to take
more care about the security of the cash card or other
instruments issued by the bank. In addition, the
limitation setting is an effective measure in reducing
losses sustained by unauthorized withdrawals.
However, there is a contradiction. The financial
institutions diverge in determining the limit. This in turn
inadvertently illustrates the rating they give to their own
security system. It may be for this reason that some
financial institutions do not have procedures to change
the limitation of the biometric authentication card.
Practical problems
The passing of the Depositor Protection Act has caused
a number of problems to financial institutions.27 To
obtain evidence to demonstrate whether a customer
was negligent, it is necessary to preserve the video
journal associated with the machine; to allocate
responsibility in respect of the indemnity, it is necessary
to provide the rules of inquiry about the practical issues
relating to the withdrawal and transfer of money using
forged or stolen cards among financial institutions, and
it is necessary to establish the system of sharing
information so that the position of the indemnity can be
properly dealt with. The Japanese Bankers Association
established and operates the information center for the
card indemnity.28 This center records the incidence of
illegal withdrawals from depositors and indemnity, and
provides information at the request of financial
institutions. It promotes the payment of a quick
indemnity to the depositor and prevents the payment of
an illegal indemnity.
Concluding remarks
Modern banking transactions depend on the use of
complex information communication technology, and
the design of such systems is affected by whether the
legislation emphasizes legal theory or technological
solutions to solve the problems that arise because of
the progress and changes in society. The policies that
the legislature adopt can be characterized into three
types: the legislation, which depends on the standard
technology at the time of the legislation; to focus on the
legal theory, and at the same time to solve problems by
improving technology; and to legislate in as technology
neutral a manner as possible. Each policy has merits
and demerits. The first can solve immediate problems
but cannot respond to changes of technology. The
second can retain consistency of legal theory but cannot
be accomplished without the continuing cooperation of
the industry and the government. The third is capable of
responding to changes in technology, but meets
difficulties when making a distinction between legal
problems and technological problems, and the
application of the law to specific cases because of the
generality or abstractness of the provisions that are
enacted.
The Depositor Protection Act appears to be
technology neutral. The law only requires financial
institutions to make a sincere effort to improve their
security, but did not provide for the introduction of a
specific form of technology. Hence it is difficult to solve
problems around the unauthorized withdrawal by way
of ATM only by the use of technological measures. The
present biometric authentication card stores the
information relating to the biometric measurement
taken from the card holder in the IC chip. This is
because the present system cannot verify the biometric
information quickly. However, this system is not a
preferable solution for security reasons, although a
recent announcement indicates that the technology has
developed further, permitting the verification of
biometric information in a few seconds.29 With this new
system, the biometric measurements of the customer
are only stored in the server of the financial institution.
Such a product may promote the replacement of the
present method of biometric authentication at ATMs.
However, ATMs in convenience stores do not include
biometric authentication. Such ATMs tend to be near the
customers home, and can be used 24 hours a day, all
the year round. For this reason, these ATMs compete
effectively with ATMs in banks. It is suggested that the
banks should make efforts to reduce the cost of
replacing ATMs with biometric authentication machines
and provide a 24 hours service to customers through
their ATMs.
Under the Depositor Protection Act, the Japanese
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financial institutions bear more responsibility for the
unauthorized withdrawal by way of the ATM using
stolen or forged cash card or other instruments.30 It is
important to keep the balance of interest between the
depositor and the financial institution. It was planned to
review the Depositor Protection Act in two years after
enactment.31 However, a review has yet to be held. In
any event, it may be worth examining the allocation of
responsibility between the depositor and the financial
institutions in respect of the biometric authentication
system.
One of the effective measures to prevent illegal
withdrawal by a stolen or forged cash card is to replace
all ATMs by machines that respond to biometric
authentication. The latest statistical data indicate that
the difficulty in solving this problem is caused by the
use of non-biometric authentication cash cards. Less
than half of ATMs include a form of biometric
authentication. The number of cases of illegal
withdrawal by means of an ATM using a stolen or forged
cash card still in a high, which is reflected in the amount
that the financial institutions indemnify depositors.
Other than the technology, it is also necessary to
recall that Japan has an aging society. A depositor can
use a biometric authentication card, providing the
biometric authentication technology has not been
successfully undermined by thieves. People of advanced
age may find it difficult to use such technology. Under
the present biometric authentication card system, the
biometric authentication card for an agent authorized to
make withdrawals for an elderly person is issued when
both the depositor and the agent physically attend the
bank together. It is natural for an aged depositor to
continue using a non-biometric authentication IC cash
card and a bank book, because they can then easily ask
the agent to make withdrawals on their behalf. It means
that the elderly depositor has the convenience of relying
on their agent, but the risk of unauthorized withdrawal
continues. Considering the population of elderly people
in Japan,32 unrealistic changes should not be made to
the system that ignores the inevitable use of the
remaining old type cash cards and bank books.
Financial institutions should not only concentrate on
improving the security of the technology itself, but also
to provide a service that remains familiar to elderly
people.
© Hironao Kaneko, 2011
30 Toru Mikami, Problems of the Depositor
Protection Act, Shindo & Uchida editors,
Continual Contract and Business Law Practices, at
267 (Shoji-Houmu 2006).
31 Supplemental Provision, section 3.
32 In 2008 the ministry of FSA stated that the
amount of personal finance is 1,500 trillion
Japanese yen, and 60 per cent belongs to aged
people (it is noted that there is not a precise
definition of “aged people” but it means over the
age of 60or 65.) (The press conference on 26
August 2008). According to the latest population
estimates (1 June 2011), the total population over
sixty years is 4,018,000. People over 60 years old
represent 31 per cent of the Japanese population:
http://www.stat.go.jp/english/data/jinsui/tsuki/in
dex.htm.
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Appendix
The Depositor Protection Act 2005
(This is an unofficial translation by the author for the
convenience of reference.)
Title: The law of protecting the depositors from
improper withdrawal by ATM using a forged card or
other instrument and a stolen card or other instrument
(The Law No. 94 in 2005)
Section 1 (Purpose)
The purpose of the law is, considering that improper
withdrawals by ATM using a forged card or other
instrument or a stolen card or other instrument often
occur, to provide for the special rules of the Civil Code
concerning withdrawals by ATM using these cards or
other instruments, and avoiding improper withdrawals
by ATM using these cards or other instruments, to
protect the depositors from improper withdrawal by
ATM using these cards or other instruments, to ensure
the reliability of bank deposits and savings and to
contribute to the progress of the sound national
economy and to provide stability for the nation in Japan.
Section 2 (Definition)
(1) In the law, the “financial institution” means as
follows;
(i) a bank, (ii) a credit union, (iii) the Federation of
Credit Union, (iv) a workers’ credit union, (v) the
Federation of Credit Union, (vi) a credit cooperative
association, (vii) the Federation of Credit
Cooperative Association, (viii) an agricultural
cooperative, (ix) the Federation of Agricultural
Cooperative, (x) a fishermen’s cooperative, (xi) the
Federation of Fishermen’s Cooperative, (xii) a
marine product processing industry’s cooperative,
(xiii) the Federation of Marine Product Processing
Industry’s Cooperative, (xiv) the Norincyukin Bank
(the Central Bank for Agriculture and Forest), (xv)
the Shoko Chukin Bank (the Central Bank for
Commercial and Industrial Association)
(2) The “depositor” means the individual who
concludes a contract with a financial institution, (the
contract of deposits and savings or including an
agreement of loan).
(3) The “genuine card or other instrument” means a
card for withdrawal or a bank book that has a function
of loaning money issued to the depositor according
the contract of deposit and saving.
(4) The “forged card or other instrument” means the
card or other instrument similar to a card that is not
the genuine card or other instrument.
(5) the “stolen card or other instrument” means the
genuine card or other instrument that has been
stolen.
(6) The “withdrawal by ATM” means the withdrawal of
deposits and savings by an automated telling
machine in accordance with the contract between a
financial institution and a depositor.
(7) The “loan by ATM” means borrowing money by
way of an automated telling machine in accordance
with the contract between a financial institution and a
depositor, except for a loan that is not secured by
deposits and savings.
Section 3 (Special rule of the Civil Code concerning the
withdrawal and loan by ATM using a card or other
instrument)
Article 478 of the Civil Code does not apply to
withdrawals by ATM and loans by ATM using a card or
an instrument similar to a card (hereinafter “ATM
withdrawal and loan”). Excepting that the article of
the Civil Code applies to the ATM withdrawal and loan
by the genuine card or other instrument.
Section 4 (Effect of the ATM withdrawal and loan by a
forged card or other instrument)
(1) The withdrawal by ATM using a forged card or
other instrument is valid, if (i) the withdrawal is based
on the intention of the depositor who concludes the
contract of deposit and saving relating to the
withdrawal by ATM, or (ii) on condition that the
financial institution concluding the contract of deposit
and savings acts in good faith and without negligence
relating to the withdrawal by ATM, and the withdrawal
is based on the gross negligence of the depositor.
(2) The depositor is responsible for the loan by ATM
using a forged card or other instrument, if (i) the loan
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is based on the intention of the depositor who
concludes the contract of deposit and saving relating
to the loan by ATM, or (ii) on condition that the
financial institution concluding the contract of deposit
and saving acts in good faith and without negligence
in relation to the loan by ATM, and the loan is based
on gross negligence of the depositor.
Section 5 (Indemnity of the amount of the ATM
withdrawal and loan using a stolen card)
(1) The depositor can request the financial institution
that he concludes the deposit and saving contract for
an indemnity of the amount of the withdrawal by ATM
using a stolen card or other instrument, where his/her
genuine card or other instrument had been stolen and
all conditions provided in the subdivisions are
fulfilled.
(i) the depositor quickly gave notice to the financial
institution after recognizing the fact of the theft of
the genuine card or other instrument.
(ii) the depositor explained the situation of the theft
adequately and without delay to the financial
institution.
(iii) the depositor informed the financial institution
that he/she had reported the theft to the
investigation office or presented materials
presuming the theft was defined by the Rule of the
Cabinet Office.
(2) The financial institution that the depositor claims
against for the indemnity provided by the provisions
of subsection 1, should pay the amount of withdrawal
by ATM to the requesting depositor (it is limited the
amount of withdrawals by ATM after the standard day.
Hereinafter “the amount of acceptable indemnity”),
except where the financial institution proves the fact
that the withdrawal by ATM is not improper by the use
of a stolen card or other instrument, or the withdrawal
is based on the intention of the depositor requesting
the indemnity. Where the financial institution proves
that the financial institution is bona fides and not
negligent in relation to the improper withdrawal by
ATM using a stolen card or other instrument, and that
the withdrawal is based on the negligence (except for
gross negligence) of the depositor, the financial
institution should pay to the requesting depositor
three fourths of the amount of acceptable indemnity.
(3) In spite of the provision of subsection 2, the
financial institution that is requested to pay the
indemnity provided by subsection 1 does not need to
pay to the depositor requesting the indemnity, where
the financial institution proves the facts provided as
follows.
(i) The financial institution is bona fides and without
negligence relating to the improper withdrawal by
ATM that is requested to indemnify when using a
stolen card or other instrument, and (a) the
withdrawal by ATM is based on the depositor’s
gross negligence, (b) the withdrawal was carried
out by the spouse, a relative within the second
degree, relatives and person living with or the
household of the depositor, or (c) the depositor
makes a false statement to the financial institution
about important things provided by subsection 1.
(ii) Theft of the card or other instrument is caused in
or with the extreme confusion by a war or a riot.
(4) If the depositor recognizes that his/her genuine
card or other instrument relating to the deposit and
savings contract is stolen, and if all conditions
provided by subsection 1 are fulfilled, the financial
institution contracting the deposit and savings
contract may not request the repayment of the loan
by ATM (it is limited to the loan by ATM after the
standard day. Hereinafter “loan at issue”), except
where the financial institution proves that, concerning
the loan by ATM using the stolen card or other
instrument that the depositor asserts was responsible
for the theft, the loan by ATM is not improper when
using the stolen card or other instrument, or that the
loan by ATM is based on the intention of the
depositor. Where the financial institution proves that
the financial institution is bona fides and without
negligence concerning the improper nature of the
withdrawal by ATM, and that the withdrawal is based
on the negligence of the depositor (except for gross
negligence), the financial institution may not request
the depositor to repay three fourths of the amount of
the loan at issue.
(5) The provision of the subsection 3 applies with
necessary modification to subdivision 4. To modify,
the phrase, “the financial institution that has been
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requested by the depositor subject to subsection 1” is
substituted by the phrase “subsection 4 means the
financial institution provided by the subsection”,
“does not need to indemnify the amount to the
depositor requesting the indemnity” is substituted by
the phrase “does not apply”, the phrase “the
withdrawal by ATM using the stolen card that is
requested to indemnify” is substituted by the phrase
“money lending by ATM provided by subsection 4”
and the phrase “the withdrawal by ATM” is
substituted by the phrase “money lending by ATM”.
(6) The standard day provided in subsection 2 and 4
of this section means the day before thirty days of the
notice provided in subsection 1(1), (if the depositor
proves the term of special circumstances such as
he/she could not know the theft took place within
thirty days after the day of the theft provided by
subsection 1 or 4 (if the day of the theft is not
ascertained, the first day of the withdrawals by ATM
or the loan by ATM using the stolen card. It is the
same meaning in this subsection and in section 7), or
as he/she could not give the notice because of
inevitable circumstance, the term of the continuing
special circumstances should be added to the thirty
days) (and if the day was before the day of the theft, it
means the day of the theft).
Section 6 (Adjustment of indemnity where the depositor
is to receive damages)
(1) The financial institution requested to pay the
indemnity may be exempt from the indemnity to the
depositor who may request the indemnity provided by
section 5(2) to the extent that the payment had been
made to the claim of the depositor in whole or in part
provided as follows. If the exception of section 5(2)
applies, the financial institution may be exempt from
the indemnity to the depositor to the extent of the
excess, if the payment of the financial institution
exceeds the amount of indemnity provided by the
exception of section 5(2) deducted from the amount
of acceptable indemnity. 
(i) the claim to the financial institution of the
withdrawal of deposit and saving of the depositor
relating to the withdrawal by ATM, if the withdrawal
by ATM using a stolen card or other instrument is
improper and may not have an effect of payment.
(ii) claim of damages or repayment of undue profit
of the depositor to the person who was responsible
for the withdrawal by ATM or other person, if the
withdrawal by ATM using a stolen card or other
instrument is improper but has an effect of
payment.
(2) the depositor who receives the indemnity in
accordance with section 5(2) may not request the
payment for the claims provided subsection 1(i) of this
section, to the extent that he/she had been
indemnified.
(3) the financial institution paid the indemnity to the
depositor according to section 5(2) may receive the
claim corresponding to the depositor’s claim provided
by section 5(1)(ii) to the extent of the amount that the
institution indemnified.
Section 7 (Expiration of the indemnity claim)
The provision of section 5 does not apply if the notice
provided by subsection 1(i) of the section was made
over two years after the day of theft provided by
subsection 1 or subsection 4 of the section.
Section 8 (Mandatory Provisions)
The agreement that violates sections 3 to 7 and is harsh
to the depositor should be invalid.
Section 9 (Protection steps from the improper ATM
withdrawal and loan using forged card or stolen card)
(1) To deter the improper withdrawal by ATM using a
forged card or other instrument or stolen card or other
instrument, the financial institution should ensure the
withdrawal by ATM is only to the authorized person as
soon as possible, by developing the authentication
technology relating to the withdrawal by ATM,
preventing the unintended disclosure of information,
introducing information systems for early detection of
unusual transactions and making other adequate
responses and should provide information, promote
and popularize the knowledge to depositors about
these responses, and should introduce proper and
necessary responses not to use an easily memorable
PIN code.
(2) Where the financial institution introduces
technological protection provided by subsection 1, the
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financial institution should consider that these
responses would not be extremely burdensome to
depositors, and make an effort to establish the
uniform standard and compatibility not to be
inconvenient for depositors.
(3) The government and the local governments
observe the status of the response provided by
subsection 1, and make the financial institution
introduce an adequate response, if it recognizes the
necessity to improve the protection of depositors from
the improper withdrawal by ATM using forged cards or
other instruments or stolen cards or other
instruments.
(4) The depositor will try to manage the card or other
instrument properly and its PIN code, to avoid the
improper withdrawal by ATM using a forged card or
other instrument or stolen card or other instrument.
Section 10 (Recording and Preserving the Scene of the
Transaction)
The financial institution should record the scene of the
ATM withdrawal and loan as a video photograph or
other recording media, and store these recording media,
and should cooperate faithfully where they are
requested by the depositor to provide information and
other cooperation to find the fact that the withdrawal by
ATM is accomplished by using a stolen card or other
instrument or a forged card or other instrument.
Section 11 (Request of cooperation to authoritative
administrative institution and depositor)
(1) The financial institution may request the necessary
cooperation of the authoritative administrative
agencies relating to the improper ATM withdrawal and
loan using a forged card or other instrument or a
stolen card or other instrument.
(2) The financial institution may request any
necessary cooperation from the depositor aggrieved
by an ATM withdrawal and loan relating to the
improper ATM withdrawal and loan using a forged
card or other instrument or a stolen card or other
instrument. The depositor should faithfully cooperate
with the request.
(3) When the financial institution requests the
cooperation of the depositor as provided by
subsection 2 of this section, the financial institution
should adequately consider the depositor’s age,
health condition and so on.
Supplementary provision
Section 1, Section 2 (Omitted)
Section 3
Considering to the circumstances around the ATM
withdrawal and loan using a card or other instrument,
such as quick development of information system and
the technology of financial service, and practice of this
law, from the view point to protect depositors further, at
the time after enforcement of this law, this law is
reviewed and if necessary the proper response may be
made based on the review.
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